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INTRODUCTION
Between 1999 and 2005, well-connected financier Jeffrey Epstein abused
more than thirty minor girls in his Florida mansion.1 Epstein traveled throughout
the United States and overseas to find these girls, violating both Florida and federal law.2 When law enforcement agencies caught wind of these crimes, government prosecutors began drafting a well-supported, fifty-three-page indictment
against Epstein.3 Those same prosecutors then mailed Epstein’s victims notification letters under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771.4
These notification letters informed Epstein’s victims of their eight enumerated
rights under the CVRA.5
The CVRA is arguably one of the most important achievements of the crime
victims’ rights movement. The CVRA gives crime victims the right to participate
in the criminal justice system and ensures that crime victims are treated with
fairness and respect.6 The CVRA provides crime victims eight enumerated rights
in relation to the government’s prosecution of a federal offense.7 One of these
rights is a crime victim’s “reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the
Government in the case.”8 This right provides victims with a voice in the criminal
justice system and the chance to express their views to the prosecutor before any
decisions are made in the case.9 But as the Epstein case exemplifies, a victim’s
right to confer with a government attorney may not apply in situations where no
indictment is formally filed.10 And as the Epstein case further exemplifies, crime
victims are often left without a voice in those situations.
But even under the CVRA, a crime victim’s remedies are limited. And over
a decade since its passage, the uncertainty remains as to how the CVRA extends
to the crime victims.11 In a majority of courts, the uncertainty of when the CVRA

1

Patricia Mazzei, Years After Plea Deal in Sex Case, Jeffrey Epstein’s Accusers Will Get
Their Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/29/us/je
ffrey-epstein-acosta-florida-sex-abuse.html [perma.cc/YSD7-2AAG].
2 Id.
3 Ali Watkins, Jeffrey Epstein Is Indicted on Sex Charges as Discovery of Nude Photos Is
Disclosed, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/nyregion/jeffreyepstein-charges.html [perma.cc/CH76-BTBH].
4 In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 2020).
5 Id. at 1199.
6 Paul G. Cassell et al., Crime Victims’ Rights During Criminal Investigations? Applying the
Crime Victims’ Rights Act Before Criminal Charges Are Filed, 104 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 59, 65–66 (2014).
7 Elliot Smith, Is There a Pre-Charge Conferral Right in the CVRA?, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
407, 407 (2010).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 408.
10 In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1200, 1205.
11 See id. at 1205.
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applies often hinges on how the CVRA defines the term “crime victim.”12 Under
18 U.S.C. § 3771(e), “ ‘crime victim’ means a person directly or proximately
harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the
District of Columbia.”13 Some courts have held that this definition suggests that
crime victims have a broad conferral right that extends pre-indictment.14 But
other courts have held that the CVRA’s conferral right is limited to cases where
the government has filed an indictment and that no such conferral right exists
pre-indictment.15
Despite the argument that the CVRA lacks textual clarity concerning the
conferral right, as a matter of statutory interpretation, it is reasonable to find a
pre-indictment conferral right in the CVRA.16 The CVRA recognizes that crime
victims exist prior to an indictment being filed by the government.17 In its own
statutory language, the CVRA states that “officers and employees of the Department of Justice . . . engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of
crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and
afforded, [their CVRA] rights.”18 This provision recognizes that crime victims
have rights even in the investigation stage of a crime, a stage that occurs before
the filing of an indictment.19 And it also recognizes that crime victims can assert
CVRA rights in a district court where the crime occurred, even if no prosecution
is underway.20 This broader reading of the CVRA shows how some courts have
reasonably found that a crime victim’s rights should and do attach before an indictment is filed.21
But opponents of the broader reading of the conferral right often point to the
fact that victims are not the only actors with interests in the criminal-justice

12

See In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he CVRA
does not grant victims any rights against individuals who have not been convicted of a
crime.”); United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (interpreting the
CVRA definition of a crime victim “to include any person who would be considered a ‘crime
victim’ if the government were to establish the truth of the factual allegations in its charging
instrument”); Searcy v. Skinner, No. 6:06-1418-GRA-WMC, 2006 WL 1677177, at *2
(D.S.C. June 16, 2006) (“[T]he CVRA does not grant victims any rights against individuals
who have not been convicted of a crime.” (quoting In re Huff, 409 F.3d at 564)); Searcy v.
Paletz, No. 6:07-1389-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1875802, at *5 (D.S.C. June 27, 2007) (“[T]he
CVRA does not grant victims any rights against individuals who have not been convicted of
a crime.” (quoting Skinner, 2006 WL 1677177, at *2)); United States v. Sharp, 463 F. Supp.
2d 556, 558 (E.D. Va. 2006) (holding that the CVRA does not apply to victims of uncharged
conduct).
13 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(A).
14 See cases cited supra note 12.
15 See cases cited supra note 12.
16 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3771.
17 Smith, supra note 7, at 437.
18 Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1)).
19 See generally id.
20 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3).
21 See cases cited supra note 12.
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system.22 The opponents argue that a broad reading of this right can have a negative impact on defendants, judges, and prosecutors.23 In reference to the negative impact on prosecutors, opponents often point out that a prosecutor’s function
is to represent society as a whole, not just the crime victim.24 Recognizing a
crime victim’s right pre-indictment could also make it more difficult for the court
to protect the defendant’s presumption of innocence. Accordingly, judges could
also be put in a more difficult position of determining whether the crime victim
was directly and proximately harmed by the conduct underlying the offenses being bargained over.
As the Epstein case exemplifies, defining and clarifying the scope of a crime
victim’s rights under the CVRA is critical in determining how prosecutors should
proceed with the case.25 It is not uncommon for prosecutors and defendants to
bargain over a plea pre-indictment rather than post-indictment.26 And pre-indictment plea bargaining occurs in essentially all white-collar criminal cases.27 In
cases where prosecutors reach pre-indictment plea agreements, a crime victim’s
conferral right is effectively denied when the CVRA does not extend pre-indictment.28 This scenario is seen in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in the Epstein
case, which denied Epstein’s victims their rights under the CVRA.29
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Crime Victims’ Rights Act—18 U.S.C. § 3771
In the last fifty years, every state has enacted legislative provisions addressing crime victims’ rights, and a majority of those states have adopted constitutional provisions concerning victims’ rights.30 This prompted Congress to consider enacting several laws addressing the aspects of crime victim rights.31 And
over the last thirty years, Congress has enacted significant crime victim-related
legislation.32 This legislation included provisions that address victim restitution
and compensation.33 And provisions that improved victim participation in

22

Smith, supra note 7, at 431.
See id.
24 Id. at 431–32.
25 See In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1199 (11th Cir. 2020).
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1(h) at 557 (3d ed. 2007).
29 See In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1199–200.
30 Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Mandamus Muddle: The Mandamus Review Standard for the Federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 5 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 123, 124 (2015).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 125.
33 Id.
23
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criminal-justice proceedings by including victim impact statements in pre-sentencing information.34
After expanding the statutory list of federal crime victims’ rights, Congress
enacted the CVRA in 2004.35 Congress enacted the CVRA with the intent of
making crime victims independent participants in criminal court proceedings.36
The CVRA’s drafters explained that crime victims, and their families, were often
ignored, cast aside, and treated as non-participants in the criminal-justice process.37 The drafters went on to emphasize the importance of how critical the
criminal-justice process was to a victim seeking justice.38
Crime victims were often kept in the dark by prosecutors, judges, and the
court system that simply did not have a place for them.39 Senator Jon Kyl explained that many victims were “literally prevented . . . from participation in any
meaningful way” prior to the enactment of the CVRA.40 He stated that victims
were being denied their basic rights by “being thrown into a system which they
did not understand, which nobody was helping them with . . . .”41 The CVRA
strengthened and expanded crime victims’ rights in the federal criminal-justice
system through its eight enumerated rights.42
The eight enumerated rights under the CVRA include:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape
of the accused.
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding, unless
the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony
at that proceeding.
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court
involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the
case.
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity
and privacy.43

34

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3771.
36 Cassell et al., supra note 6, at 66.
37 150 CONG. REC. 7297 (2004).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 7298 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl).
41 Id.
42 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 28, § 24.4(d), at 419, § 26.5(d), at 814; 7 id. § 27.2(b), at 11;
see also 5 id. § 21.3(f), at 768.
43 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a).
35
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Within the CVRA, Congress also included a definition of the “crime victim”
eligible to assert rights.44 Congress defined a crime victim as “a person directly
and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an
offense in the District of Columbia.”45 However, designated representatives can
assert the victim’s rights on behalf of a crime victim when the victim is a minor,
incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased.46 The CVRA also includes many important enforcement mechanisms. These mechanisms include (1) directing courts
to ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in the CVRA; (2)
directing the United States Attorney General to take measures to ensure that federal prosecutors make their best efforts to ensure that the crime victim is aware
of their rights; (3) requiring a specific statement that the victim of a crime may
assert their rights; and (4) allowing a writ of mandamus that asserts the victim’s
rights to an appellate court.47 The CVRA provides these enforcement mechanisms to ensure the rights of victims through the eight enumerated rights the
CVRA guarantees.
B. The Mandamus Review Standard for the Crime Victims’ Rights Act
A writ of mandamus is a judicial remedy in the form of an order from a court
to the government to do some specific act that the body is obliged under law to
do.48 The writ of mandamus is a part of the common law heritage that shaped
American jurisprudence.49 In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court addressed
the issuance of writs of mandamus.50 The Court in Marbury explained that to use
a mandamus as a proper remedy, the person to whom the writ is directed must
be the appropriate subject of the writ, and the individual seeking the writ must
be without other legal remedies.51 The Court again reviewed its mandamus jurisprudence in Roche v. Evaporated Milk Association.52 In Roche, the Court again
explained that the function of a mandamus is to correct “an abuse of judicial
power, or refusal to exercise it.”53
The CVRA allows a crime victim to, “in essence, immediately appeal a denial of their rights by a trial court to the court of appeals, which must rule ‘forthwith.’ Simply put, the mandamus procedure allows an appellate court to take
timely action to ensure that the trial court follows the rule of law” established by

44

Id. § 3771(e)(2).
Id.
46 Id.
47 Tobolowsky, supra note 30, at 126–27.
48 James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory
Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1530–31 (2001).
49 See generally id.
50 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 168–77 (1803).
51 Id. at 169.
52 Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
53 Id. at 31.
45
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the statute.54 The writ of mandamus ensures that crime victims who are denied
their rights have standing for appellate review of that denial.55 It allows a crime
victim to apply for a writ of mandamus to the appropriate appellate court, which
requires the appellate court to take the writ and order the relief necessary to protect the crime victim’s rights.56 This provides victims with standing to appear in
the appellate courts in the United States and with review for possible error below.57 And this provision also requires that courts review these types of cases.
This provision also allows the government to apply for a writ of mandamus instead of the crime victim.
A majority of circuit courts have adopted mandamus review of CVRA petitions.58 The issues most frequently addressed in the mandamus petitions are the
crime victims’ participatory rights to confer with the prosecutor and a victim’s
role in plea agreements.59 A victim’s role in plea agreements raises many issues
as to when a victim’s rights attach. Although some courts hold that the victim’s
rights attach pre-indictment, others hold that crime victims do not have any rights
in the plea-agreement stage of litigation.60
C. A Victim’s Role in Plea Agreements
The criminal-justice system has changed dramatically over time in numerous
respects. In recent years, “plea agreements have grown to become the rule in the
criminal justice system . . . , rather than trials.”61 Courts around the United States
have realized the importance of regulating these plea agreements and the importance of protecting a defendant’s rights in plea agreements.62 However, as
courts often protect a defendant’s rights in plea agreements, little is done to protect victims’ rights in plea agreements.63 Further, the United States Supreme
Court has focused solely on shaping plea agreements and defendants’ rights, “but
in doing so, [it] ignore[d] victims and their statutory rights” under the CVRA.64
As plea agreements continue to “become more visible, . . . the victims still remain hidden.”65

54

Tobolowsky, supra note 30, at 127.
Paul G. Cassell, Protecting Crime Victims in Federal Appellate Courts: The Need to
Broadly Construe the Crime Victims’ Rights Act’s Mandamus Provision, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
599, 599–601 (2010).
56 See id. at 599.
57 Id.
58 Tobolowsky, supra note 30, at 151.
59 Id. at 152.
60 See cases cited supra note 12.
61 Dana Pugach & Michal Tamir, Nudging the Criminal Justice System into Listening to
Crime Victims in Plea Agreements, 28 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 45, 46 (2017).
62 Id.
63 See id.
64 Id. at 46–47.
65 Id. at 46.
55
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“Plea agreements are the paradigm case of complicated decisions.”66 These
agreements suffer from time constraints, and the main actors in the game are the
prosecutors, defendants, and judges.67 Prosecutors tend to make plea agreements
to avoid costly litigation and to help speed up the judicial process.68 Defendants
are presented with the plea agreement and the option to accept the agreement and
avoid trial.69 Judges often must decide quickly whether to accept these plea
agreements, and, often times, judges approve the agreements.70 However, while
these three actors work through the plea agreement, the victim is rarely addressed
and is often forgotten. For the victim, this case is pivotal. It can determine
whether the victim feels safe, finds peace, or even feels recognized by the very
legal system created to protect her.71 Once the plea agreement is signed, victims
have little chance to challenge the process or even ask questions about the process.72
The criminal-justice system continues to ignore a victim’s rights in plea
agreements and fails to recognize a victim’s role in plea agreements. This is true,
as evidenced by the Epstein case, even after the enactment of the CVRA in
2004.73 Due to the dominance of plea agreements in the criminal-justice process,
the importance of victims’ rights in plea agreements has become pivotal.74
II. THE HISTORY OF THE CVRA
A. The History of Silence
Before examining the Epstein case, it is important to recognize the United
States’ long history of silencing victims. Discrimination against survivors has
been in existence for hundreds of years.75 American history is filled with examples of oppressive and sexually violent acts perpetrated against minorities and
women.76
Before there was Christine Blasey Ford, there was Recy Taylor, an African-American woman who was raped by six white men in 1944 and fought for justice with
the help of Rosa Parks. And in between the two of them, there was Anita Hill,

66

Id. at 64.
Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation to Guidelines, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 323, 324 (2007).
68 Id.
69 Pugach & Tamir, supra note 61, at 56.
70 See id. at 64.
71 Id.
72 O’Hear, supra note 67, at 324.
73 In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1199 (11th Cir. 2020).
74 O’Hear, supra note 67, at 325.
75 Sandra Park, How America Systematically Fails Survivors of Sexual Violence, ACLU (Oct.
16, 2018, 6:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/violence-against-women/howamerica-systematically-fails-survivors-sexual-violence [perma.cc/4QUJ-XMN5].
76 Id.
67
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Tarana Burke, Alyssa Milano, Lupita Nyong’o, Tanya Selveratnam, Aly Raisman, and many, many more.77

Throughout history, victims were often dismissed by law enforcement, ostracized by their communities, or even prosecuted for false reporting.78 These
victims often faced multiple layers of discrimination and a network of systems
that foster it, leaving them hopeless.79 And when a victim does not have the ability, the means, and the right to express her rights, she is effectively silenced by
society.80 This silence left victims and advocates powerless in a society that was
founded to protect them.81 The oppression of crime victims in the criminal-justice system led to victims advocating to dismantle policies and practices that have
allowed violence and discrimination to flourish.82 This movement picked up momentum in the early 1980s, with many advocates taking to the streets to challenge
the norms that have silenced victims for many years.83
B. Giving Victims a Voice
The Crime Victims’ Right Movement began long before Congress enacted
the CVRA. In the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan appointed the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, paving the way for the CVRA.84 The
Task Force was established to address the oppression of crime victims in the
criminal-justice system.85 The Task Force noted that “the criminal justice system
has lost an essential balance. . . . The victims of crime have been transformed
into a group oppressively burdened by a system designed to protect them.”86
Recommendations made by the Task Force prompted multiple states to take
action.87 Many states addressed crime victims by amending their constitutions or
by taking legislative reform.88 “These measures guaranteed victims’ rights in the
criminal process, such as the right to be notified of court proceedings, to attend
those proceedings, and to speak at appropriate points in the process, such as plea

77

Id.
Id.
79 Id.
80 Courtney E. Ahrens, Being Silenced: The Impact of Negative Social Reactions on the Disclosure of Rape, 38 AM. J. CMTY. PSYCH. 263, 263 (2006).
81 Id.
82 Paul G. Cassell, The Maturing Victims’ Rights Movement, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2
(2015).
83 Id.
84 Cassell et al., supra note 6, at 63.
85 Id. at 63–64.
86 Id. at 63 (quoting LOIS HAIGHT HERRINGTON ET AL., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS
OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 114 (1982)).
87 Id. at 64.
88 DEAN G. KILPATRICK ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS—DOES
LEGAL PROTECTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 1 (1998), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles/173839.pdf
[perma.cc/3MR2-42J6].
78
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bargaining and sentencing.”89 After many states passed these amendments, advocates for victims’ rights focused on federal legislation to protect crime victims.90 Thus, they approached Congress with legislation that would solve these
problems.91
Congress enacted that legislation in 2004.92 “The CVRA was enacted with
nearly unanimous support and little discussion.”93 This led to phrasing that “is
‘sparse’ in ‘technical detail’ and lacking in procedural guidance.”94 However,
Congress’s goal was clear: it “sought to change the system’s obliviousness to
crime victims that often ‘left crime victims and their families victimized yet
again.’ ”95 Congress emphasized the importance of allowing crime victims to
play a role in the criminal-justice process and making victims independent participants in the criminal-justice process.96 Congress viewed the CVRA as establishing a victim’s right to participate in the judicial process.97
But Congress rushed to pass the CVRA, and as such, it suffers from a dearth
of legislative history.98 Neither the House nor the Senate held hearings.99 The
Senate did not publish a committee report. And although the House published a
report, it failed to provide guidance.100 It failed to define a “crime victim.”101
“The CVRA reads more like an amendment than a statute, with sweeping statements of rights and no discussion of how those rights should be implemented.”102
C. The 2015 Amendments
In 2015, Congress amended the CVRA.103 One of the amendments to the
CVRA included the addition of a ninth enumerated right.104 This right included
89

Cassell et al., supra note 6, at 64.
Id.
91 Id. at 65–66.
92 18 U.S.C. § 3771.
93 Zulkifl M. Zargar, Secret Faits Accomplis: Declination Decisions, Nonprosecution Agreements, and the Crime Victims’ Right to Confer, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 343, 358 (2020).
94 Id. (quoting Fed. Ins. Co. v. United States, 882 F.3d 348, 358 (2d Cir. 2018)).
95 Cassell et al., supra note 6, at 66 (quoting 150 CONG. REC. 7296 (2004) (statement of Sen.
Dianne Feinstein)).
96 See Zargar, supra note 93, at 360.
97 Id.
98 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33679, CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ACT: A
SUMMARY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF 18 U.S.C. § 3771, at 5 (2021).
99 See id.
100 Id. at 10.
101 Id. at 6.
102 Blanche Bong Cook, Stepping into the Gap: Violent Crime Victims, the Right to Closure,
and a Discursive Shift Away from Zero Sum Solutions, 101 KY. L.J. 671, 704 (2012–2013)
(quoting Erin C. Blondel, Note, Victims’ Rights in an Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J. 237,
258 (2008)).
103 Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, 129 Stat. 227, 240
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9)–(10)).
104 Id.
90
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a crime victim’s “right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or
deferred prosecution agreement.”105 This required federal prosecutors to notify
victims about plea agreements or deferred prosecution agreements that were finalized prior to the formal filing of charges.106 Put simply, Congress amended
the CVRA to make it clear: crime victims must be notified of such agreements
made or reached prior to charging.107 However, what remains unclear is what
type of notice should be given to victims. Based on a series of cases out of district
courts, the answer is that it varies according to the facts of the case.108
D. The Department of Justice’s Take
In 2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ) concluded that a victim’s right
under the CVRA attaches only “from the time that criminal proceedings are initiated.”109 The DOJ formed its opinion based on the CVRA’s definition of crime
victim, its legislative intent, and its structure.110 It found that a closer reading of
the CVRA demonstrated little support for the notion that crime victims’ rights
apply pre-charge or pre-indictment.111 However, some find this analysis unpersuasive.112
The DOJ’s “lead argument is that the CVRA’s definition of ‘victim’ presupposes that criminal charges have been formally filed.”113 The CVRA defines a
victim as someone who is “directly and proximately harmed as a result of the
commission of a Federal offense.”114 The DOJ views this definition as suggesting
that a crime victim can only be determined after the decision to charge an individual of a federal offense.115 Specifically, the DOJ emphasizes that a crime victim cannot be identified until there is “a sworn written statement of probable
cause to believe that a particular defendant committed an . . . offense,” i.e., an
indictment.116 However, this reading does not conclusively resolve the question
of when rights attach. The DOJ routinely identifies victims before filing a criminal complaint because victim identification is required by statute and through its

105

Id.
Id.
107 See id.
108 Paul G. Cassell, The Victims’ Rights Amendment: A Sympathetic, Clause-By-Clause Analysis, 5 PHX. L. REV. 301, 310–11 (2012).
109 Availability of Rights Under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, 34 Op. O.L.C. 239,
239 (2010) [hereinafter Availability of Rights].
110 Id.
111 See id.
112 Cassell et al., supra note 6, at 75.
113 Id. at 76.
114 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(A).
115 Availability of Rights, supra note 109, at 245.
116 Id.
106
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internal policy directives.117 Regardless, the DOJ has not changed its stance on
when rights attach to crime victims.118
Shortly after the 2015 amendment, the DOJ again emphasized these views
by filing a brief in the Southern District of New York.119 The brief explained the
DOJ’s view that the CVRA only applies after criminal charges are filed.120 The
DOJ continues to maintain its narrow reading of a victim’s rights under the
CVRA, maintaining that an expansive reading of the CVRA would open up the
floodgates.121 However, following the DOJ’s narrow reading, Representative
Jackie Speier introduced the Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act,
seeking to expand a victim’s right to confer with the government under the
CVRA.122
E. The Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act of 2019
Representative Jackie Speier introduced the Courtney Wild Crime Victims’
Rights Reform Act to honor of all of Epstein’s victims in 2019.123 This Act seeks
to expand a victim’s right of conferral under the CVRA by honoring the “victims
who fell prey to Jeffrey Epstein in Florida and were kept in the dark as federal
prosecutors hashed out a secret and shockingly lenient plea deal.”124 The Act
focuses on making certain that “victims of crime are treated with dignity throughout a criminal case” and seeks to “avoid further victimization” of those victims.125 The legislation will update and improve the CVRA by clarifying the
scope of victims’ rights and creating stronger judicial and administrative processes for victims to assert their rights.
The proposed language states that victims would have a right to conferral
“about any plea bargain or other resolution of the case before such plea bargain
or resolution is presented to the court or otherwise finalized.”126 This language
seeks to expand a victim’s right under the CVRA and protect victims in cases
where prosecutors read a non-prosecution agreement, like in the Epstein case.127
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And, as Representative Speier states, it takes “steps to make sure that the courts
and the Department of Justice follow through on the promises of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act.”128 Representative Scott Perry also noted that this proposed bill
is about “ensuring justice for the most vulnerable among us—to ensure that survivors of crime are made whole, and not re-victimized by unfair, opaque legal
proceedings.”129 And, finally, as Representative Lois Frankel said, “This bill ensures a more victim-centered process so that such a miscarriage of justice never
happens again.”130
The Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act will clarify that victims of federal
crimes have the right to confer with the government and be informed about key
pre-charging developments in a case, such as plea bargains or non-prosecution
agreements.131 It will also increase the ability for victims to assert and protect
their rights in court by allowing them to challenge proceedings when they were
not given proper notice.132 And third, it will require that victims be heard in court
when their rights are isolated and provide courts discretion to award other just
and appropriate relief, including rescinding non-prosecution agreements.133 But
it is important to note that this proposed bill has not yet left the House. It has now
been referred to the subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security.134 However, if passed, this proposed bill will go a long way in improving
the treatment of crime victims in the criminal-justice system, and it further clarifies that victims have a conferral right pre-indictment under the CVRA.
III. THE EPSTEIN CASE
The Epstein case centered around Jeffrey Epstein’s alleged sexual molestation of around thirty young girls between 2002 and 2005 at his West Palm Beach
mansion.135 Despite the overwhelming evidence against Epstein, the government
prosecutor entered into a pre-indictment non-prosecution agreement with Epstein, promising to not prosecute him in exchange for him pleading guilty to two
state felonies for soliciting prostitution with a minor.136 Because of the agreement, no federal indictment was ever filed.137
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Epstein’s victims were left in the dark, never told about the possibility of an
agreement or the agreement itself until after the deal had been made.138 When
the victims learned of the agreement, two of them filed suit in federal court under
the CVRA, alleging that both the agreement and the prosecutors violated their
CVRA right to confer and their right to be treated fairly.139 The government then
contended that it had no obligation to extend victims any rights under the CVRA
because no federal criminal charges were ever filed by the prosecutor.140
The district court sided with the victims, finding that the CVRA attached to
the victims pre-indictment.141 It noted that in cases where no formal charges have
been filed, the CVRA conferral right still attaches from when a crime victim is
identified by the prosecutors.142 However, the district court explained that although Epstein’s victims demonstrated that the government violated their rights
under the CVRA, in the end, the victims’ relief was either (1) rendered moot by
Epstein’s death or (2) outside the jurisdiction of the court.143
The government appealed this decision to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing
again that the victims do not have a conferral right in cases where the prosecutors
do not choose to file an indictment.144 The Eleventh Circuit overturned the district court’s ruling in a 120-page split-discussion.145 However, it has since vacated the opinion pending an en banc rehearing.146 But the question still remains:
Does the CVRA attach to crime victims prior to the government filing an indictment?
A. The Charges
From 1999 to 2005, Jeffrey Epstein sexually abused more than thirty girls in
one of his many Florida mansions.147 These girls include Ms. Wild, who filed the
complaint as Jane Doe Number One, and Jane Doe Number Two.148 This abuse
came to the attention of the Palm Beach Police Department in 2005.149 During
the Palm Beach Police Department’s investigation of the case, officers asked the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to help investigate the sexual abuse.150 The
138
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Palm Beach Police Department provided the FBI with that information, and the
FBI determined that the allegations of abuse were credible.151 The case was then
presented to the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida.152
The United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida then
contacted Epstein in 2007.153 This began the official negotiating period between
Epstein and the government.154 During this time, the crime victims were not notified of any negotiations between the two parties, although the victims were already known by the FBI and the United States Attorney’s office.155
When negotiations came to a close, Epstein secured a non-prosecution agreement with the government.156 This agreement provided Epstein with an escape
route; no federal charges would be brought against him in exchange for him
pleading guilty to two counts of soliciting prostitution from a minor, a state felony.157 After entering those two guilty pleas, Epstein was sentenced to eighteen
months in state jail.158 Epstein spent much of his jail term on “work-release,”
where he was able to reside in his luxurious home and office.159 “He was also
required to register as a sex offender and reach financial settlements with the
dozens of victims who came forward in the case.”160
However, Epstein’s victims were never informed of this non-prosecution
agreement until after it had taken effect.161 Even after signing the agreement, the
government continued to tell the victims that the case was under investigation
and that the victims must be patient.162 Eventually, news broke about this nonprosecution agreement, and the victims filed a suit in federal district court under
the CVRA.163 The victims requested that the district court (1) rescind the provisions in the non-prosecution agreement, (2) declare that the Constitution would
allow the prosecution of Epstein’s co-conspirators despite the agreement, and (3)
enjoin the government to confer with the victims and make best efforts to protect
the victims’ CVRA rights.164
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The victims’ lawsuit argued that the prosecutors had violated their CVRA
right to confer and their right to be treated fairly.165 The victims also argued that
the prosecutors had a duty to confer with them before signing the non-prosecution agreement and before it took effect.166 In response, the government argued
that it had no obligations under the CVRA to confer with the victims because
Epstein had never been formally charged with any crimes.167
The district court agreed with the victims, finding that their rights had been
violated under the CVRA.168 The court held that the CVRA rights of conferral
and informing crime victims must extend to non-prosecution agreements.169 The
court ruled that the government had failed to advise the victims about its intention to enter into the non-prosecution agreement.170 The government then subsequently appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that there is no pre-indictment
conferral right under the CVRA.171
B. The Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion
The Eleventh Circuit held that a victim’s rights under the CVRA did not
attach when the government entered into the non-prosecution agreement with
Jeffrey Epstein, including the right to confer with the federal government’s lawyers and the right to be treated fairly by them.172 It found that because the government had not filed charges or otherwise commenced criminal proceedings
against Epstein, the victims had no rights under the CVRA as no criminal proceedings had begun in the case.173 However, the Eleventh Circuit recognized the
uncertainty in other circuits as to whether the CVRA applied before criminal
proceedings begin.174
After the Court noted that many district courts and circuit courts are divided
on the issue of pre-indictment conferral rights, the Court considered the arguments in each case.175 It noted that the most important factors to consider as to
whether the CVRA applies pre-indictment are (1) the text of the CVRA, (2) the
historical context of the CVRA, and (3) the prosecutorial discretion it intends to
safeguard.176 As to the text of the CVRA, the Court explained that reading the
statute in its entirety suggests that the CVRA is best interpreted to apply “only
after the commencement of criminal proceedings” because the term crime victim
165
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implies the commission of a federal offense.177 The Court also noted that the
CVRA’s history shows that it was enacted after the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10607 (VRRA).178 And, it noted that the CVRA risks impairing prosecutorial discretion when applied pre-charge.179
C. Analyzing the Eleventh Circuit’s Decision
When analyzing whether a crime victim has the reasonable right to confer
with the government pre-indictment, the Court first focused on the text of the
CVRA.180 Section A of the CVRA itself reads: “[t]he reasonable right to confer
with the attorney for the Government in the case.”181 The Court noted that “the
case,” referred to in the provision, indicates that an ongoing judicial proceeding
should be taking place, as opposed to an investigation.182 The majority went on
to explain that the word “case” in a criminal context signifies that proceedings
have already commenced and that the “attorney for the Government” indicates
that a pending case already exists.183
However, when analyzing a crime victim’s “right ‘to be treated with fairness
and with respect,’ ” the Court observed that no textual restriction or contextual
restriction exists to limit this provision to only post-indictment cases.184 The
Court justified this hiccup by applying the statutory canon noscitur a sociis,
meaning that it took the provision in context with the reasonable right to confer
provision.185 The Court used this textual analysis to conclude that the CVRA
should apply post-charge, finding that the two provisions “speak directly to judicial enforcement of victims’ statutory rights.”186 However, the Court made no
refence to the CVRA’s other six provisions.187
As to the historical context, the Court simply compared the CVRA to the
Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act (VRRA), a previous victims’ rights act
passed by Congress.188 The VRRA, prior to being repealed, awarded crime victims pre-indictment rights and ensured that victims received mandated services
and rights under federal law.189
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The Court explained that “[t]he CVRA repealed and replaced some parts of
the VRRA, but left others intact.”190 It explained that the VRRA’s provisions
were explicit when victims’ rights applied pre-charge and demonstrate that Congress “indisputably knew when it framed and enacted the CVRA” that it could
expressly extend victims-rights protections pre-charge.191 The Court observed
that Congress obviously had knowledge of these pre-indictment rights in the
VRRA but chose to repeal those portions of the VRRA by not including them
explicitly in the CVRA.192 It found that Congress’s intentional silence was compelling when considering not to award a victim rights pre-indictment under the
CVRA.193
And finally, the Court also justified its holding by explaining that if the
CVRA attached pre-indictment, it would open the floodgates and tarnish prosecutorial discretion.194 These floodgates would require law enforcement officers
to consult with victims “before conducting a raid, seeking a warrant, making an
arrest, interviewing a witness, convening a lineup, or conducting an interrogation.”195 The Court explains that this slippery slope would open the floodgates to
finding that the CVRA applies before an investigation takes place.196
The Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the principle of prosecutorial discretion in finding that the CVRA does not apply pre-charge.197 In its own words, the
factor of prosecutorial discretion is a “weighty one” that could impact the government’s discretion that the CVRA appears to safeguard.198 The CVRA itself
explicitly prohibits any interpretation of the entire CVRA that impairs the government’s discretion.199 It explained that in the absence of charges, the government faces enormous pressure to find that an individual has “directly and proximately” caused the crime victim harm and committed a federal offense.200 But in
the absence of charges, this determination would exhaust government resources
to determine if an individual directly and proximately caused harm to a crime
victim without the government pressing charges.201
The Court also explained that applying CVRA rights pre-indictment could
significantly intrude on prosecutor discretion because the rights would force the
government to consult with victims more frequently and infringe on the absolute
and exclusive power prosecutors hold in deciding to press charges.202 It would
190
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also create slippery slope problems that would plague § 3771(c)(1) of the CVRA
in the future.203 And all of these results, the Court concluded, should be
avoided.204
D. Senator Feinstein and Former Senators Kyl and Hatch’s Amici Curiae
Brief
Following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, Senator Dianne Feinstein and former Senators Jon Kyl and Orrin Hatch filed an amici curiae brief.205 This brief
argued that an en banc rehearing in the Eleventh Circuit “is needed to vindicate
the rights of crime victims and ensure their involvement in the criminal justice
system.”206 Additionally, the senator and former senators argue that “rehearing
en banc is needed to ensure fidelity to statutory text and restore uniformity
amount the courts of appeals.”207 The senators emphasized their strong interests
in ensuring that the landmark CVRA legislation they drafted “is properly construed, and that crime victims and their families are afforded their hard-fought
and much-deserved rights.”208 Senators Kyl, Feinstein, and Hatch explained that
this “[n]ation has made great strides toward treating crime victims and their families with greater respect, providing them with much-needed assistance, and ensuring they are included in criminal justice proceedings that impact their lives so
profoundly.”209
The CVRA took a major step forward in addressing crime victims’ rights.210
And as those senators correctly noted, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision would
“undo decades of progress toward recognizing and vindicating the vitally important rights of crime victims.”211 The senators also believe that the Eleventh
Circuit erred in finding that crime victims’ rights do not attach pre-indictment
and urged the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider its decision in the upcoming en banc
hearing.212
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
The Eleventh Circuit is the first circuit court to find that CVRA rights do not
apply pre-charge. This position could have vastly detrimental side effects. As the
amici senators have emphasized, this decision undoes all of the progress made
203
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towards “recognizing and vindicating the vitally important rights of crime victims.”213 The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling seems contrary to Congress’s intent and
overlooks the fact that Congress is currently working on a bill that expands the
right to confer to pre-indictment situations.214 Congress enacted the CVRA to
ensure that victims have a right to be informed during the plea-bargaining process.215
In enacting the CVRA, Congress’s goal was clear. It sought to change the
system’s obliviousness to crime victims that left crime victims and their families
victimized yet again. This goal is evident from Congress’s efforts to introduce
the Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act to honor all of Epstein’s victims in
2019. This Act continues to show Congress’s efforts to expand a victim’s right
of conferral under the CVRA. Although the DOJ continues to maintain its narrow
reading of a victim’s rights under the CVRA, the CVRA should not be limited
for the sake of opening imaginary floodgates.216
V. THE PROBLEMS WITH PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
This Part explores whether the CVRA asks too much of prosecutors when it
extends a victim’s rights pre-indictment. Prosecutors have an ethical responsibility to protect the public’s interest and ensure just enforcement of the United
States’ criminal laws. However, the prosecutor’s discretion remains intact even
when the right to confer is mandatory.
A proper understanding of the purpose and scope of the CVRA, as discussed
below, makes it clear that the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion is not curtailed.
Although the CVRA does not require federal prosecutors to consider victims’
interests, it does ask that prosecutors make their “best efforts” to include crime
victims in the judicial process and to enforce the victims’ rights.217 It also addresses the argument of how and why ethical conflicts can arise when prosecutors put the victims’ private interests before the interests of the public at large.
A. The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutors have an ethical responsibility to protect the public’s interest and
ensure just enforcement of the United States’ criminal laws. But the CVRA asks
prosecutors to make their “best efforts” to enforce a victim’s rights.218 A
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prosecutor’s decision is often “guided by two basic questions: ‘Can I prove the
case?’ and ‘Should I prove the case?’ ”219
To answer these questions, prosecutors often look to the strength of the evidence, the victims, a defendant’s characteristics and circumstances, and the philosophies of doing justice and fairness. Taking into consideration the interest of
prosecutorial discretion, the CVRA aims to prevent actions that impair the government’s discretion.220 But the question remains as to whether representing
crime victims’ private interests under the CVRA creates an ethical conflict for
prosecutors.
B. Prosecutorial Discretion Under the CVRA
The CVRA states that nothing within the Act “shall be construed to impair
the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction.”221 Prosecutors have wide discretion in determining whether to pursue
non-prosecution agreements instead of a conviction or dismissing charges.222
Under these agreements, the government agrees to drop charges against an individual in exchange for that individual’s compliance with the terms of the agreements.223 Accordingly, the CVRA allows prosecutors the discretion to pursue
non-prosecution agreements.224 But the CVRA does not allow prosecutors the
right to violate a crime victim’s rights in doing so.225
A proper understanding of the purpose and scope of the CVRA makes it
clear that the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion is not curtailed. The CVRA does
not stop prosecutors from making decisions that the victims do not like, nor does
it prevent prosecutors from directing the prosecution.226 Rather, the CVRA eliminates the problem of victims being kept in the dark by prosecutors too busy to
care enough.227 The CVRA only requires the government to confer with the victims before ultimately exercising its discretion.228

219

Bruce Frederick & Don Stemen, The Anatomy of Discretion: An Analysis of Prosecutorial
Decision Making 3 (Nat’l Crim. Just. Reference Serv., NCJ No. 240334, 2012), https://www.o
jp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240334.pdf [perma.cc/5H7A-YCMP].
220 See 18 U.S.C. § 3771.
221 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6).
222 Frederick & Stemen, supra note 219, at 25.
223 See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.600 (2018).
224 See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9); In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196,1199 (11th Cir. 2020).
225 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(1).
226 Pugach & Tamir, supra note 61, at 49.
227 See id.
228 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3771.

22 NEV. L.J. 405

426

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:1

C. How States Address the Conferral Right and Prosecutorial Discretion
Both state and federal legislation have recognized a victims’ conferral
right.229 The statutory rights of victims vary widely from state to state.230 The
right to confer with the prosecutor before charges are filed could be either discretionary or mandatory.231 Some states have laws that require prosecutors to
notify victims, and others require a general right to confer.232 The states provide
prosecutors with the discretion to confer with victims.233 However, most importantly, it should be noted that the prosecutor’s discretion remains intact even
when the right to confer is mandatory at the state level.234
However, federal courts generally are reluctant to interfere with the prosecutorial discretion to this degree.235 Some federal courts claim that representing
a victim’s private interests would create an ethical conflict for prosecutors as
soon as the victim’s interests diverge from those of the prosecutor or the public.236 They argue that prosecutors only have the responsibility of seeking justice
for the parties and that, under the CVRA, victims are not specifically identified
as a party.237
Many opponents to the pre-indictment conferral right argue that Congress
may have tried to protect prosecutorial discretion by refusing to confer party status on victims.238 The opponents argue that representing a victim’s private interests would infringe on a prosecutor’s discretion because a prosecutor’s interest
does not always align with the victim’s interest.239 They also focus on the issue
that arises when victims “ask courts to reject plea agreements or vacate guilty
pleas on the ground that the victims did not sufficiently confer with the prosecution regarding the plea.”240 They claim that by asking courts to reject any agreement, it puts the court “in the awkward position of second-guessing the prosecutor’s decisions,” which, in turn, would “encourage prosecutors to act courteously
toward victims while continuing to represent the United States’ interests.” 241
The Fifth Circuit confronted this very issue.242 In In re Dean, the prosecution
arranged a secret plea bargain to resolve a company’s liability for violations of
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environmental laws that resulted in an explosion at an oil refinery.243 These violations resulted in the release of dangerous gas into the environment, which then
led to the catastrophic explosion in Texas City, Texas.244 The explosion killed
fifteen workers and injured many more.245 The government in Dean chose not to
confer with the victims before reaching a plea bargain with the oil company, BP
Products North America.246 Because the government did not confer with the victims before reaching a plea bargain with BP, the victims sued to secure protection
of their guaranteed right under the CVRA to confer with the attorney for the
government.247 The Fifth Circuit held that prosecutors had to confer with victims,
but it refused to compel the trial court to reject the plea agreement.248 However,
the decision in Dean suggests that the Fifth Circuit also agrees that the CVRA
does not impinge on prosecutorial discretion.249
But other courts have ruled that the CVRA does not create a right for crime
victims to participate in plea negotiations. A district court in New York noted
that the CVRA does not give victims a “veto power” over any prosecutorial decision or strategy.250 Similarly, the Second Circuit has found that “[n]othing in
the CVRA requires the Government to seek approval from crime victims before
negotiating or entering into a settlement agreement.”251 Although both these
cases stand for the holding that a victim does not have a conferral right that applies pre-indictment under the CVRA, both emphasize the overarching idea that
the CVRA does not aim to give victims a veto power, nor does it intend to influence a prosecutor’s decision.252
D. The CVRA Does Not Impinge on Prosecutorial Discretion
Some prosecutors claim that crime victims exercising their CVRA rights are
likely to attempt to influence prosecutor decision-making when prosecutors have
critically important discretionary choices to make.253 They also claim that victims’ rights add another variable into the already complex web of prosecution.254
This complex web of prosecution often centers around pre-trial release, charging,
trials, pleas, and sentencing.255
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But a victim’s voice is only one piece of the puzzle when it comes to whether
a prosecutor chooses to enter into a non-prosecution agreement. Research suggests that factors such as the type of offense, strength of the evidence, a defendant’s characteristics, a victim’s characteristics, and previous charges of the defendant are direct influences on whether a prosecutor chooses to go to trial.256
Prosecutors who argue that a victim’s voice may influence prosecutor decisionmaking often overlook the “big picture” that prosecutors are required to take into
account many factors when making their decisions.257
CONCLUSION
After the Epstein case, the criminal-justice system is at a turning point for
victims’ rights under the CVRA. The Epstein case raises a serious question as to
whether victims’ rights attach pre-indictment, and many courts are split on this
issue. While drafting the CVRA, Senator Dianne Feinstein and former Senators
Jon Kyl and Orrin Hatch focused on creating a criminal system that no longer
turns a blind eye to its victims. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in the Epstein
case does the opposite; it turned a blind eye to all of Epstein’s victims.
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision overlooked six of the CVRA’s provisions
and narrowly viewed the CVRA’s historical context. Both the provisions and the
historical context of the CVRA clearly indicate the CVRA was intended to cover
victims’ rights pre-indictment. The first provision of the CVRA provides that
DOJ officers “engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of [a]
crime” must make an effort to ensure victims are notified of and awarded their
CVRA rights.258 But the Eleventh Circuit dismissed this provision and instead
justified its narrow reading of this provision as an instruction to DOJ attorneys.
It found that this provision is best read as “to whom” and not a “when” provision.
But this limited reading does not consider why the CVRA was enacted.
The CVRA is a tool used to balance the system, giving victims a voice in a
system that often failed them. The intended result of the CVRA was to take into
consideration a victim’s interests, thereby building a stronger victim-focused administrative process and giving the victim a voice that helps preserve her rights
without burdening the criminal-justice process. And, if used properly, the CVRA
does not impede on a prosecutor’s discretion.
But a victim’s voice is only one piece of the puzzle when it comes to whether
a prosecutor chooses to enter into a non-prosecution agreement. And although
the CVRA does not require federal prosecutors to consider a victim’s interests,
it does ask that prosecutors make their “best effort” to include crime victims in
256

Frederick & Stemen, supra note 219, at 4.
Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—and What Can Be Done
About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2017).
258 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) (“Officers and employees of the Department of Justice and other
departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and
accorded, the rights described in subsection (a).”).
257
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the judicial process and to enforce the victims’ rights. Prosecutors balance many
factors when deciding to pursue a non-prosecution agreement. And those prosecutors often look to the “big picture” when deciding to prosecute crimes.259 One
single factor, such as a victim’s opinion or voice, does not overshadow the other
factors the prosecutor must consider when entering into a plea agreement.

259

Rakoff, supra note 257.
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